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Gonzalez-Lopez and Its Bright-Line Rule: Result of 
Broad Judicial Philosophy or Context-Specific 
Principles? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a five member majority, per 
Justice Scalia, held that when a court wrongfully denies a defendant’s 
counsel of choice, the remedy is automatic reversal, not some form 
of harmless error review.1 The Supreme Court’s decision, by refusing 
to balance a defendant’s rights against a trial’s overall fairness, 
epitomizes rule-based jurisprudence. The decision, however, raises 
the question of whether the bright-line rule it adopted arose from a 
broad judicial philosophy that favors limited judicial discretion or 
from the application of context-specific factors. This Note 
acknowledges that a methodological preference for limited judicial 
discretion likely influenced the majority opinion, but argues that 
considerations arising out of the constitutional rights of those 
accused of crimes also justified the bright-line rule in this case. These 
context-specific principles are found in literature, including the work 
of Jeffrey L. Fisher,2 the advocate who argued Gonzalez-Lopez. With 
this case, Fisher completed a triumvirate of successful Supreme Court 
arguments that started with Crawford v. Washington3 and Blakely v. 
Washington.4 
Crawford, Blakely, and Gonzalez-Lopez share a common 
characteristic: each relies on a bright-line rule that eschews a 
balancing of the interests of the government and the defendant. The 
former two cases support Fisher’s “constitutional choice” analysis, 
which suggests that the Court has a textual justification for applying 
bright-line rules where the text of the Constitution reflects a choice 
 
 1. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
 2. Jeffrey L. Fisher is a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Seattle, Washington, 
and a professor at Stanford Law School. 
 3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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rather than a value.5 The use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, 
however, is not clearly justified by this constitutional choice analysis, 
but by context-specific factors that encourage more mechanical 
protection of criminal rights. Even though Fisher’s constitutional 
choice analysis does not explain the use of a bright-line rule in 
Gonzalez-Lopez, the presence of context-specific factors, independent 
of a general preference for limiting judicial discretion, justified the 
majority’s use of a bright-line rule in this case. 
Rule-based jurisprudence operates by identifying constitutional 
principles and then positing rigid safeguards against their 
infringement. The safeguard, or bright-line rule, that emerges from 
this process encourages predictability in the law6 and represents a 
synthesis of values and principles.7 Constitutional interpretation 
based on such absolute rules limits judicial discretion8 and ensures 
that judges enforce individual rights—particularly in criminal cases, 
“when it may be unpopular to do so.”9 When universal rules govern 
each litigant’s case, the system fosters a sense of true equality  
before the law.10 Although modern commentators disagree on the 
 
 5. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1522–28 (2006). 
 6. Even those who generally oppose bright-line rules agree that some situations require 
them, such as where there is a need for predictability. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE 
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 212–13 (1999) (“When there is 
a strong interest in predictability, or when the Court has reason for confidence in a wide 
ruling, narrowness is a mistake.”). 
 7. Id. at 213. 
 8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68. 
 9. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1512; see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 865, 874–75 (1960). Justice Black thought it necessary to establish absolute rules in 
order to protect against the power of the government: 
To my way of thinking, at least, the history and language of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights, which I have discussed with you, make it plain that one of the 
primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from 
the Government all power to act in certain areas—whatever the scope of those areas 
may be. If I am right in this then there is, at least in those areas, no justification 
whatever for “balancing” a particular right against some expressly granted power of 
Congress.  
Id. 
 10. Justice Scalia has spoken of the importance of binding each individual by universal 
rules: 
When a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if 
the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but 
that it be seen to be so. . . . [I]t does not greatly appeal to one’s sense of justice to say: 
“Well, that earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine plus one.” Much better, 
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merits of bright-line rules, it was the norm in early constitutional 
law.11 
Confidence in the bright-line approach eroded as it often 
produced a poor fit between doctrine and the real world.12 A 
balancing test can address this problem by facilitating an equitable 
result while still respecting constitutional values.13 Like a bright-line 
rule, a balancing test identifies the constitutional principle, but then 
proceeds to balance that principle against a competing interest.14 
Justice Holmes, for example, favored such balancing so that the 
absolutes of the past would yield to the practicalities of the day.15 
Although his view eventually carried the day, it was still a dissenting 
view in the 1928 case of Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. 
Knox.16 In that case, the majority determined that the states could 
 
even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization 
introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in 
explanation of the decision.  
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
For an argument that liberty is furthered by a rule-of-law system that generates predictability, 
see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–73 (1944). 
 11. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 949 (1987) (discussing cases); see also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 432 (1995). 
 12. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 953. For indications of the modern Court’s inclination 
(at least during the 1990s) to use balancing tests, see David L. Faigman, Madisonian 
Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1994); see 
also Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 301 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), but 
also recognizing counterexamples in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19 
(1992) and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990)). 
 13. Justice O’Connor has been the flag bearer of the flexible approach. See Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 321 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If indeed the choice is 
between adopting a balanced case-by-case approach that takes into consideration the values 
underlying the Bill of Rights, as well as the history of a particular sentencing reform law, and 
adopting a rigid rule that destroys everything in its path, I will choose the former.”); JOAN 
BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 278 (2005); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1506 
(describing Justice O’Connor as a “consummate incrementalist”). 
 14. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 987 (“[B]alancing appears as an extra step in 
constitutional interpretation. Once a court has done the hard work of explicating a 
constitutional provision through the usual methods of textual, precedential, and 
consequentialist reasoning, the result is subjected to another test—the weight of competing 
interests.”). 
 15. Id. at 954. 
 16. See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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not tax gasoline sales to the Federal Government because a state 
could not “retard, impede, and burden” the operations of the 
United States.17 Justice Holmes dissented to such a rigid rule against 
burdening federal functions, arguing that that the Court had the 
ability to strike a balance between permissible and burdensome 
regulation.18 With confidence in the ability of the Court to balance 
competing interests, Justice Holmes declared that “[t]he power to 
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”19 As in the 
taxation of federal functions, application of a balancing approach in 
other areas opens up a middle ground of constitutionality, allowing 
constitutional doctrine to conform to the exigencies of reality. 
A decision to adopt a balancing approach has several additional 
advantages. Balancing epitomizes concepts of justice,20 fairness, and 
reasonableness.21 In areas of doctrinal uncertainty, balancing based 
on judicially determined factors allows for a gradual development of 
the law, giving “flexibility without sacrificing legitimacy.”22 Indeed, 
at a time when opposing values and rights vary in weight relative to 
one another and from year to year, balancing leads to effective case-
by-case administration of justice. Changes can occur in one direction 
or another, providing for expansion or restriction of rights based on 
the present societal circumstances.23 
 
 17. Id. at 222 (majority opinion). 
 18. Id. at 223 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court which so often has defeated the 
attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far 
without wholly abolishing the power to tax.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908). 
Pound argued that although the “scientific” nature of law tended toward public confidence, 
the ultimate goal was justice, which sometimes required more flexibility: 
Scientific law is a reasoned body of principles for the administration of justice, and 
its antithesis is a system of enforcing magisterial caprice, however honest, and 
however much disguised under the name of justice or equity or natural law. But this 
scientific character of law is a means,—a means toward the end of law, which is the 
administration of justice. Law is forced to take on this character in order to 
accomplish its end fully, equally, and exactly; and in so far as it fails to perform its 
function fully, equally and exactly, it fails in the end for which it exists. 
Id. 
 21. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 962. 
 22. Id. at 961. 
 23. Id. at 960. 
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The balancing approach, however, can distract courts from the 
importance of constitutional values.24 When a constitutional principle 
reflects only an invitation to balance competing interests, 
constitutional theory has less value.25 With such relativity, the 
individual rights protected by the Constitution occasionally give way 
to other interests. Although reasonable people disagree about the 
merits of sacrificing individual rights in certain contexts, our 
Constitution prescribes certain procedures that must not give way to 
balancing. Both Crawford and Blakely accord greater recognition to 
some of these constitutional procedures. 
In Crawford, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right 
“to be confronted with witnesses”26 required that a court subject 
testimonial evidence to cross-examination. That is, if a witness made 
a statement against the defendant and later became unavailable to 
testify in trial, that statement may be admitted only if the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.27 In 
establishing this mechanical protection, the Court set aside the prior 
test, which protected a defendant’s right to confrontation by 
requiring that an out of court statement offered against the 
defendant either fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”28 The prior test 
abstracted the Confrontation Clause to its underlying purpose—
protection against unreliable evidence—and then allowed a judge to 
admit evidence under circumstances in which that purpose would 
not be furthered by cross-examination.29 The Crawford Court, 
 
 24. Id. at 992 (“The balancing drum beats the rhythm of reasonableness, and we march 
to it because the cadence seems so familiar, so sensible. But our eyes are no longer focused on 
the Constitution.”). 
 25. Id. (“Ultimately, the notion of constitutional supremacy hangs in the balance. For 
under a regime of balancing, a constitutional judgment no longer looks like a trump. It seems 
merely to be a card of a higher value in the same suit.”). 
 26. The Sixth Amendment provides thus: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 27. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 28. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 29. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1507. 
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however, said that the Constitution required more, holding that only 
an absolute rule would satisfy the defendant’s right to confront the 
witnesses against him.30 
Similarly, when the Court in Blakely confronted the issue of 
whether a judge could increase a defendant’s sentence based on 
factual findings not made by a jury nor admitted by the defendant, it 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that 
each fact affecting the sentence must be admitted by the defendant 
or derive from a jury verdict.31 Under Washington law, after a 
defendant pled guilty to, or was convicted by jury for, an offense 
corresponding to a statutory maximum sentence, the judge could 
increase that sentence based on specified aggravating factors.32 The 
Court held that in the matter of sentencing, the Constitution 
foreclosed a “judicial estimation of the proper role of the judge.”33 
Judges cannot use their discretion to balance away the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial because the Constitution already outlines a 
procedure—jury trial—that protects the rights of the defendant. 
Both Crawford and Blakely recognized the importance of using a 
bright-line rule—a mechanical safeguard—to protect the interests 
recognized by the Sixth Amendment. Fisher seems to accurately 
hypothesize that the bright-line rule in those cases stemmed from 
the Court’s decision to read the Constitution as having chosen to 
protect constitutional rights through an absolute rule.34 In 
Crawford, the Court recognized a constitutional choice in the right 
 
 30. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. The Court stated as follows: 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the 
right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability 
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: 
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, 
not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be 
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. 
Id. For an account of the argument Fisher made before the Supreme Court in Crawford, and 
how one concurring Justice opposed the categorical nature of his proposed rule, see Fisher, 
supra note 5, at 1507–08 (recounting his advocacy for a bright-line rule, and how he faced the 
argument that the “Sixth Amendment right must yield on occasion” to a higher “truth-
seeking” goal (citation omitted)). 
 31. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–04 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 299–300. 
 33. Id. at 307. “[T]he very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the 
Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.” 
Id. at 308. 
 34. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1522. 
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“to be confronted” by witnesses. Similarly, the Court in Blakely 
decided that the Constitution had already chosen the basis upon 
which convicted criminals could be sentenced—the jury trial. The 
Court in Gonzalez-Lopez also adopted an absolute rule, ensuring 
automatic reversal for a defendant wrongly denied counsel of choice. 
Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez provides additional opportunity to analyze the 
merits of a bright-line rule and the considerations supporting the 
Court’s use of such rules. This analysis will show that even where 
Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does not explain the Court’s 
use of a bright-line rule, the Court has other reasons to apply these 
rules in the area of criminal constitutional law, including the Court’s 
competence over criminal trials, a greater need for formalism in 
criminal constitutional law, and the relative constancy of the criminal 
process over time. Absent such factors, it could appear that the only 
commonality between the three cases lies in the identity of the 
author of each of the opinions: an ardent supporter of the bright-line 
rule and limiting judicial discretion,35 Justice Scalia.36 
This Note first gives context and background to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice, including both the 
constitutional history and some of the judicial developments that led 
up to Gonzalez-Lopez. This context and background highlights the 
uncertain history of the right. Part III follows this uncertain history 
into Gonzalez-Lopez and discusses the Justices’ divergent views on 
the nature and scope of the right to counsel of choice and the 
appropriate remedy for violations of that right. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the merits of rule-based jurisprudence in this context and 
examines whether Fisher’s hypothesis adequately explains the 
Court’s use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. In the end, 
although the Court may not have responded to a constitutionally 
chosen bright-line rule—as, according to Fisher, the Court did in 
 
 35. For purposes of this Note, bright-line rules are treated as limiting judicial discretion. 
For commentary that more fully develops this point, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE 158–62, 222–28 (1991); Stephen E. Gottleib, The Paradox of Balancing 
Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 843 (1994). 
 36. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 210 (“[A]bove all, [Justice Scalia] seeks to develop 
rules of interpretation that will limit the policy-making authority and decisional discretion of 
the judiciary . . . .”); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1297, 1320–23 (1990); Tom Levinson, Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The 
“Fundamentalist” Judicial Persona of Justice Antonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REV. 445, 452–53 
(2006). See generally Scalia, supra note 10. 
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Crawford and Blakely—the bright-line rule is supported by factors 
that encourage the use of mechanical rules to administer criminal 
constitutional rights. Although a preference for limiting judicial 
discretion may have also influenced the Court’s decision, the 
outcome is correct, and is supported by principles specific to criminal 
constitutional law. 
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
Although the full meaning and scope of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has not been fully developed,37 the right to counsel 
recognizes the importance of fairness and arguably grants the 
defendant a degree of control over the conduct of the defense.38 
That defense, if effective, will help to protect the integrity of the 
judicial system.39 This Part first briefly traces the right to counsel 
from the English common law to the Bill of Rights, and then focuses 
on how the courts have developed the doctrine under the Sixth 
Amendment.40 This brief outline establishes the context and 
background necessary to understand the discussion of Gonzalez-
Lopez by showing that history and precedent did not compel the 
Court to apply a bright-line rule to protect a defendant’s right to 
counsel of choice. 
A. History of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The American understanding of the role of counsel in criminal 
proceedings has evolved according to changing legal conditions. A 
 
 37. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 52 (2002) 
(“[The] meaning and scope of the ‘right to [counsel of choice]’ have not been fully developed 
or explained by the Supreme Court.” (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 
491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989))). 
 38. Id. at 51–52 (identifying several reasons behind allowing defendants to select their 
own counsel, including “to grant the criminal defendant effective control over the conduct of 
his defense,” to promote trust and confidence in the legal system, to enhance the feeling of 
fairness, and to increase the probability that the accused will feel reconciled with the outcome 
of the trial (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165 (1988) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting))). 
 39. A credible judicial system must make some provision for an adequate criminal 
defense. On the importance of constitutional safeguards to such a defense, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 643 (1996) (“Counsel, 
confrontation, and compulsory process are designed as great engines by which an innocent 
man can make the truth of his innocence visible to the jury and the public.”). 
 40. For an exhaustive list of bibliographical sources relating to the history of the right to 
counsel, see TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 216–19. 
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gradual evolution has occurred from the English common law, 
which often denied the right to counsel, to our present system, 
which recognizes a right to counsel of choice for those with means 
to hire counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel for all 
defendants. Underlying this historical process was the idea that 
fairness depends upon an adversarial system in which a defendant has 
a meaningful opportunity to prove innocence. 
1. English common law 
In light of the English common law right to counsel, the 
American system has come a long way in improving the fairness of 
criminal trials. A criminal trial in late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century England looked much different from a criminal 
proceeding of today. Private parties brought criminal charges against 
the defendant, with the judge acting as a neutral referee between the 
two litigants.41 A defendant did not have a right to access the 
evidence against him or to compel witnesses in his behalf.42 For the 
most serious crimes, defendants could not have the assistance of 
counsel,43 while a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or trespass 
could hire a lawyer.44 Without evidentiary safeguards and the 
advocacy of counsel, fairness depended in large part upon how the 
judge chose to conduct the trial. 
Under the English common law, fairness took a back seat to the 
need to maintain the supremacy of the government in the eyes of the 
people.45 Without a police force and strong government to enforce 
 
 41. Id. at 2–3 (describing the conditions of trial, including the chaos created by the 
defendant’s ability to question witnesses at will). 
 42. See id. at 3 (“Ordinarily, an individual charged with a felony was confined until the 
time of trial. He did not receive a copy of the indictment, was not informed of the evidence 
against him, and had no process for compelling witnesses to testify on his behalf.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 43. Id. (stating that a defendant could not have assistance of counsel if charged with 
serious crimes, “such as murder, manslaughter, larceny, robbery, or rape, or treason or 
misprision of treason”). 
 44. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 
8 (1955) and John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 
263, 308 (1978)). 
 45. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (1992) (“This antipathy that the British 
common law displayed toward the assistance of counsel derived from the weakness of the 
government vis-à-vis its enemies.” (citing FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO 
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the laws, the criminal justice system could not afford to be generous 
to criminal defendants.46 Since felonies presented the greatest risk to 
the stability of the society, the government had greater incentive to 
deny defendants the assistance of counsel. Such a concession would 
impede the efficiency of the system and undermine the power of the 
government.47 Although some commentators justify the English 
denial of counsel by the fact that defendants faced simple charges 
brought by private parties with relatively equal power,48 this would 
not explain why those charged with misdemeanors would receive 
assistance of counsel, while defendants in felony cases had to go it 
alone. 
At any rate, with few exceptions, defendants accused of serious 
crimes in England had no right to hire counsel until the early 
nineteenth-century. Although the Treason Act of 1695 and gradual 
judicial concessions increased the availability of counsel to the 
accused,49 the right was not substantial and its existence and scope 
depended on the discretion of the judge.50 With time, the 
government increased in stability and criminal trials eventually took 
on a more prosecutorial nature.51 In view of these changed 
circumstances, in 1836, Parliament passed a law that allowed every 
defendant to hire counsel, and in 1903, it extended that right to 
indigent defendants in cases where “justice required such an 
appointment.”52 
In summary, at the nascence of the United States Constitution, 
the right to counsel in England depended upon the discretion of the 
judge in all cases except misdemeanors and charges of treason. Even 
those who could afford to hire counsel had no certainty as to 
whether a court would grant that privilege. The English system 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
10 (1951))). 
 46. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 3–4. 
 47. Id. at 4. 
 48. Id. at 4–5. 
 49. Id. at 6–7. 
 50. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 10 (“Because there was no statutory basis for this practice 
[of permitting defense counsel to perform various trial functions on behalf of the defendant], 
variations were frequent.”); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 7 (citing J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME 
AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800, at 359 (1985) and Langbein, supra note 44, at 
313). 
 51. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 7. 
 52. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 12; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 8–9. 
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relied on the discretion of the judge to ensure the fairness of the 
proceedings. 
2. The Sixth Amendment and the Constitutional Convention 
The American criminal justice system originally patterned itself 
after the English system,53 but it gradually changed. In the early 
eighteenth-century, many colonies addressed crime through the 
public prosecutor, displacing the prior system of private criminal 
litigation.54 This difference in procedure may have prompted the 
colonies to create allowances for counsel to ensure the fairness of 
trials.55 In addition, the number of trained legal professionals 
increased in the colonies, and respect for the legal profession grew.56 
With a greater need for representation and an increased number of 
respected legal professionals, the colonies recognized that counsel 
should play a greater role in criminal defense. This change would 
give the defendant a chance to prove innocence while facing a 
powerful state.57 
The changed colonial attitude toward the assistance of counsel is 
most apparent in the constitutional and statutory provisions that 
protected the right. By 1791, only one of the colonies still adhered 
to the English common law approach of denying the accused the 
assistance of counsel.58 The remainder recognized the important role 
 
 53. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 15 (“Colonial records are produced to demonstrate that 
a deliberate and conscious effort was made in colonial America to copy English substantive and 
procedural rules.”); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9. 
 54. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9 (citing Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the 
Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 101 n.112 (1995)). 
 55. Id. at 10; see also GARCIA, supra note 45, at 4 (“The prosecutor wielded great power 
due to his familiarity with procedural niceties, the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of juries, and the personnel 
of the court. As a consequence, the assistance of counsel and the allied rights ultimately 
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment became essential to counter the prosecutor’s advantage.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 56. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9–10. Initially, the colonists had fostered hostile 
sentiment toward lawyers. William F. McDonald, In Defense of Inequality: The Legal Profession 
and Criminal Defense, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 13, 20–22 (William F. McDonald ed., 
1983). 
 57. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(stating that the rights conferred on defendants are “designed to redress the advantage that 
inheres in a government prosecution”). 
 58. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932); BEANEY, supra note 44, at 16–22 
(summarizing constitutional and statutory provisions in each colony); GARCIA, supra note 45, 
at 4 (stating that most state constitutions contained a right to counsel after the colonies 
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counsel played in ensuring the fairness of the trial process. Given that 
most colonies had already recognized the right to counsel, it is 
hardly surprising that the Bill of Rights would contain such a 
provision. 
The right to counsel in the Bill of Rights did not generate much 
discussion, although two states included a right to counsel provision 
in their suggested lists of rights.59 The Convention adopted the 
provision without any reported discussion.60 This silence could 
indicate that the states generally considered their practices to be in 
accord with the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel but could also 
indicate relative indifference or consensus. In any event, the lack of 
reported discussion concerning the right to counsel certainly does 
not aid the courts in interpreting the clause.61 
In summary, the historical record does not definitively resolve 
the question of whether the right to counsel of choice deserves the 
protection a bright-line rule provides. Those who oppose the bright-
line rule can emphasize the fairness considerations underlying 
historical developments. For example, with the development of the 
adversarial system, defendants needed counsel in order to obtain a 
fair trial result. If fairness is the core reason for providing the right to 
counsel, then, as some would argue, the right to counsel of choice 
should not be absolute, but should be enforced only when unfairness 
would result without its enforcement. On the other hand, those who 
would favor an absolute rule can look to the history of the right to 
counsel and argue that the American rejection of the English 
system—which placed the right to counsel within the discretion of 
judges—indicates a preference for enforcing constitutional rights 
through mechanical safeguards. Thus, the historical record leads to 
potentially conflicting conclusions as to the nature and scope of the 
right and the extent to which it should be protected. History does 
not unequivocally guide courts in making these decisions. 
 
declared independence (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 828–29 (1975))); 
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 10–13. 
 59. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 22. 
 60. Id. at 24 (noting a “dearth of discussion” concerning the right to counsel 
provision). 
 61. Id. 
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B. Fairness: A Main Focus of Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence 
In the years immediately following the Constitutional 
Convention, the Supreme Court provided little interpretation of the 
right to counsel because the Bill of Rights originally only applied 
against the actions of the Federal Government.62 Although the 
Fourteenth Amendment placed limitations on the activities of the 
states, it did not incorporate all the amendments in the Bill of Rights 
against the states. Indeed, when the Court finally began enforcing 
the right to counsel against the states, it acted under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Although the Court initially 
interpreted the right to counsel based on the fairness considerations 
of due process, the Court now acts under the Sixth Amendment.64 
Thus, the meaning of the right to counsel is not necessarily limited 
to the fairness aspects of the Due Process Clause. 
Notwithstanding the separation of the right to counsel analysis 
from the due process analysis, the Court’s demonstrated willingness 
to place limitations on the right to counsel of choice shows that 
fairness still plays an important role in determining the scope of the 
right. For example, the Supreme Court in Wheat v. United States 65 
held that the defendant’s right to counsel of choice must sometimes 
give way to the need to avoid conflicts of interest between chosen 
counsel and other witnesses. When the Court chose to maintain 
overall trial integrity at the expense of a defendant’s right to choose 
counsel, some commentators lamented that the Court had relegated 
the right to counsel to a fairness-based due process determination.66 
 
 62. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (“These amendments demanded 
security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government—not against those 
of the local governments.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 60 (“The question, however, which it is our duty, and 
within our power, to decide, is whether the denial of the assistance of counsel contravenes the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.”); Stuntz, supra 
note 11, at 435–36. 
 64. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 308 (2004) (discussing the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment after granting certiorari on case from Washington 
Court of Appeals); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (applying Sixth Amendment to 
habeas petition from state court conviction in which defendant claimed denial of the right to 
counsel). 
 65. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 66. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (“In essence, the Court has adopted the tenet that 
defendants possess a revocable privilege to counsel rather than a fundamental constitutional 
right.”). 
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In Wheat, representation by Mr. Wheat’s choice of counsel could 
have impaired the integrity of the decision through conflicts of 
interest. Mr. Wheat and several co-defendants were charged with 
conspiracy to distribute marijuana.67 Prior to Mr. Wheat’s trial, two 
co-defendants represented by Eugene Iredale received favorable 
results, which caused Mr. Wheat, apparently encouraged by these 
results, to request Iredale as his counsel.68 In a hearing held to 
discuss a possible conflict of interest, Mr. Wheat argued that little 
potential for conflict existed because (1) he was willing to waive his 
right to conflict-free counsel, (2) the possibility for a conflict of 
interest was too tenuous, and (3) all three defendants waived any 
future claims of conflict of interest and agreed to let Iredale 
represent Mr. Wheat.69 
In response, however, the trial court held that “an irreconcilable 
conflict of interest exist[ed]” and denied petitioner’s request to be 
represented by Iredale.70 At Mr. Wheat’s trial, the government 
planned to call the second co-defendant to testify against Mr. 
Wheat.71 In that situation, ethical prescriptions could have prevented 
Iredale from effectively cross-examining the second co-defendant. 
The prior representation created a serious conflict of interest such 
that the court would have risked error on appeal if it had allowed 
representation by Iredale. The court denied the substitution, Mr. 
Wheat proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.72 
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial court 
struck the proper balance between a defendant’s qualified right to 
counsel of choice and the court’s need to avoid conflicts of interest.73 
The Supreme Court also affirmed, emphasizing the fairness 
interest underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.74 
Although the right to attorney of choice “is comprehended by the 
Sixth Amendment,” the Court cited fairness as the core purpose of 
 
 67. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154. 
 68. See id. at 154–55. 
 69. See id. at 156–57. 
 70. See id. at 157 (“I don’t think it can be waived, and accordingly, Mr. Wheat’s request 
to substitute Mr. Iredale in as attorney of record is denied.” (quoting the district court judge’s 
ruling regarding the conflict of interest)). 
 71. Id. at 156. 
 72. Id. at 157. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 164. 
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the Amendment.75 If the importance of one’s counsel of choice were 
overemphasized, a court would have to grant every defendant’s 
preference, regardless of resulting trial conflicts. The Court 
recognized a presumption in favor of counsel of choice but not an 
absolute right.76 An absolute right to determine the identity of 
counsel went against the Court’s understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment, under which “the appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer 
as such.”77 
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissenting opinions gave 
greater weight to the importance of a defendant’s autonomy interest 
in conducting the mode of defense. The dissenters reasoned that a 
defendant should have a “fair opportunity to secure counsel of his 
own choice,”78 although they agreed that this right is not absolute.79 
The dissent, however, would accord greater weight to a defendant’s 
interest in controlling the aspects of the defense, because “it is [a 
defendant] who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”80 With 
respect to the conflicts of interest, the dissent argued that respecting 
a defendant’s autonomy interest would best promote the fairness of 
the trial, at least in the important sense of how a defendant perceives 
the fairness of the trial.81 
Wheat illustrates that a defendant does not have an absolute right 
to counsel of choice and that restrictions on that right often stem 
from considerations of trial integrity.82 Given the impact of Wheat, 
 
 75. Id. at 159. 
 76. See id. at 160. 
 77. Id. at 159 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984)). 
 78. Id. at 165 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 
(1932)). 
 79. See id. at 166. 
 80. Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975)). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 166 (“[A] trial court may in certain situations reject a defendant’s choice 
of counsel on the ground of a potential conflict of interest, because a serious conflict may 
indeed destroy the integrity of the trial process.”). In addition, a defendant does not have the 
right to choose a lawyer who is not a member of the bar, “may not insist on representation by 
an attorney he cannot afford” or who refuses to stand as counsel, and may not select an 
attorney who has a previous relationship with an opposing party. Id. at 159 (majority opinion). 
Finally, under proper circumstances, a court may effectively disqualify a defendant’s choice of 
counsel if a trial is scheduled to begin on a certain date, and defendant’s counsel has other 
commitments until after that date. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 
2567 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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further concessions might also occur in the name of fairness. Fairness 
considerations could lead the Court to treat the right (1) as a due 
process-based right to a fair trial; (2) as a right that promotes the 
integrity of the trial process, or, applying a more absolute view; (3) 
as a procedural requirement that grants the defendant control over 
the defense.83 Of the three options, the language in the Court’s 
opinion could lead to the conclusion that the right to counsel means 
little more than a due process-based determination of fairness.84 Yet 
the other interests, especially the defendant’s interest in controlling 
the conduct of the defense, arguably deserved recognition.85 A future 
Court would have to give more direction. 
The Court in Wheat circumscribed the right to counsel of choice 
by the need to maintain the integrity of the trial process. Its 
discussion focused on the issue of whether the trial court wrongfully 
denied the defendant’s counsel of choice. The facts in Wheat differ 
from Gonzalez-Lopez, where the Court had to decide the remedy for 
the wrongful denial of counsel of choice. Nonetheless, Wheat still 
provides a good backdrop to the discussion of Gonzalez-Lopez 
because it shows how the Court has evaluated the right based on 
fairness considerations, not on an absolute conception of the right. 
III. UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-LOPEZ 
A. Facts 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court faced the issue of 
whether wrongful denial of a defendant’s counsel of choice required 
 
 83. See Eugene L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise 
in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 381 (1992) (stating that the 
Court could go in one of three directions from Wheat: (1) it could retain the right only so far 
as it furthers the Sixth Amendment purpose of obtaining a fair trial, (2) it could focus on the 
institutional goals promoted by the right, or (3) it could view the right as part of the Sixth 
Amendment’s interest in granting criminal defendants control over their trials). 
 84. See id. at 351 (stating that although Wheat could be seen to isolate the Sixth 
Amendment’s goal of assuring a fair trial as the sole purpose of the right to counsel, the Court 
likely did not intend such a shift in its position). 
 85. See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent 
Criminal: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for 
the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 188 (1998) (“In addition to the systemic interest in 
promoting the adversarial system of criminal justice, recognition of the right to counsel of 
choice also implicates the accused’s personal interest in autonomy.”). 
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the remedy of automatic reversal.86 The facts involve several 
characters: Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, charged with conspiracy 
to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, and three 
defense attorneys.87 Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez’s family hired the first 
attorney, who later withdrew after Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez selected 
different counsel.88 The federal district court, however, denied this 
choice of counsel, because the district court believed the attorney 
Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez selected had violated a court rule in a previous 
representation.89 Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez proceeded to trial with a third 
attorney and was found guilty by the jury.90 On appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the district court had misinterpreted the court rule, 
making the denial of the defendant’s chosen counsel erroneous.91 
More importantly, the Eighth Circuit determined that the 
erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice was not subject to 
harmless error review and thus required automatic reversal, although 
it acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not addressed the 
issue.92 The court recognized two types of constitutional errors: trial 
errors, which occur during the presentation of evidence to the jury, 
and structural errors, which affect the “framework within which the 
trial proceeds.”93 The court determined that harmless error review 
provides a sufficient remedy for trial errors, because the effect of the 
error “may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other 
evidence presented . . . .”94 Structural errors, on the other hand, 
require retrial because they negatively affect “the framework within 
which the trial proceeds.”95 The Eighth Circuit characterized the 
 
 86. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564–66 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 2560. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2561. 
 92. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 932–33 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). The Supreme Court previously hinted that the wrongful denial of 
counsel may require automatic reversal, but it had not decided the issue. See Flanagan v. 
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (cited in Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933). 
 93. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 932 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999)). 
 94. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993)). 
 95. Id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 8); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 
(1991). 
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erroneous deprivation of counsel as a structural error, aligning itself 
with the majority of circuit courts that had addressed the issue.96 
Having determined that the denial of counsel of choice 
constituted a structural error, the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
conviction and remanded for a new trial.97 In doing so, it recognized 
that the Sixth Amendment ensures not only fairness, but also that a 
defendant will have a certain degree of control over the conduct of 
the defense.98 The government appealed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.99 
B. Holding 
The majority affirmed the Eighth Circuit, holding that the 
erroneous denial of counsel of choice required automatic reversal of 
the conviction, with no showing of prejudice.100 In coming to that 
conclusion, the majority first showed that the Sixth Amendment 
“right to have Assistance of Counsel” was not merely the right to 
effective assistance of counsel but the right to assistance of one’s 
chosen counsel. Additionally, the majority defined the remedy for the 
denial of the right as automatic reversal.101 Justice Scalia wrote for 
the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer. The dissent, written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, disagreed on 
both points.102 
 
 96. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 
1074 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam); Bland v. California, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds 
by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 
F.2d 993, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 
(1st Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 285–86 (6th Cir. 1985)). The Eighth 
Circuit recognized that Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2004), had taken 
a middle-ground approach by adopting an adverse effect standard, but joined the majority of 
circuit courts in holding that the wrongful denial of attorney of choice warrants automatic 
reversal of the conviction. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933. 
 97. Id. at 935. 
 98. Id. 
 99. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2560 (2006). 
 100. See id. at 2564–66. 
 101. See id. at 2561, 2564–66. 
 102. For an interesting discussion of the ideological division between conservative 
Justices in criminal cases, see Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (2006). 
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1. Majority’s evaluation of the Sixth Amendment right: Counsel of 
choice 
After reciting the pertinent text of the Sixth Amendment, Justice 
Scalia cited cases for the position that the Sixth Amendment allows 
defendants with sufficient resources to choose who will represent 
them.103 Although several factors limit the scope of this right, the 
government conceded that the district court had erroneously denied 
Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez’s choice of counsel.104 The analysis of the 
Court, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that Mr. Gonzalez-
Lopez should have been able to hire the chosen attorney. The only 
questions were whether that denial violated the Sixth Amendment 
and, if so, what remedy a court should supply. 
Justice Scalia began by rejecting the government’s proposed rule 
defining when the right to counsel had been violated. The 
government argued that the Assistance of Counsel Clause would not 
be violated unless a defendant who had been erroneously denied 
counsel of choice could show that the denial prejudiced the 
defense.105 This evaluation would essentially parallel the analysis 
applied when a defendant claims that counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel.106 This focus on the fairness aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment would arguably collapse the right to counsel into the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.107 The majority rejected the 
government’s proposed prejudice requirement, asserting that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees more than effective assistance of 
counsel.108 
In effect, the government would have the Court recognize that 
the Sixth Amendment assures a fair trial and then disregard the right 
 
 103. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 159 (1988) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to 
say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair 
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–96 (1984). Justice Scalia quoted a 
portion of Strickland that states that prejudice requires a showing of a “reasonable probability 
that . . . the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2561 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 107. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562 (“[T]he Government’s argument in effect reads 
the Sixth Amendment as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and then 
proceeds to give no effect to the details.”). 
 108. Id. at 2563. 
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to counsel of choice “so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”109 
Justice Scalia condemned this approach because it “abstracts from 
the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.”110 He 
identified the parallel process formerly applied to Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, in which the Court had said that “the purpose 
of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of 
evidence,”111 and then did away with formal confrontation of 
witnesses when the evidence “bore [sufficient] ‘indicia of 
reliability.’”112 The Court later recognized that the right to 
confrontation existed independent of any judicial estimation of the 
reliability of evidence, holding that the Confrontation Clause 
“commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”113 
Likewise, the Court stated that it would not reduce the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice to the identified purpose of 
ensuring the fairness of trials, thereby allowing a court to deny that 
right when it would not further the purpose of fairness. Instead, the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires “not that a trial be 
fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, 
that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be 
best.”114 The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right to 
counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial.115 If the Sixth 
Amendment really only ensured fairness, then the defendant would 
need to show prejudice (lack of fairness); but because the defendant 
has a right to counsel of choice, its erroneous deprivation requires 
nothing more “to make the violation ‘complete.’”116 
An analogy to the right to effective assistance of counsel 
misconstrues the Sixth Amendment, because the right to counsel and 
the right to effective assistance of counsel originated differently. The 
right to effective assistance of counsel, even for those without 
resources to hire an attorney, originated from the fairness 
 
 109. Id. at 2562. 
 110. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980)). 
 113. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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requirement inherent in due process.117 With its origins in fairness, it 
makes sense to require a defendant to show prejudice in order to 
complete a violation of the right.118 The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice, however, exists apart from due process 
protections, and the Court refused to merge the two rights.119 
Having refused to merge the right to effective assistance with the 
right to counsel of choice, the Court held that the erroneous denial 
alone violated the constitutional rights of a defendant. 
2. Majority’s remedy for erroneous denial: Automatic reversal 
Denial of constitutional rights rarely warrants automatic reversal 
of a conviction; in most cases, the government has the opportunity 
to show that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”120 
An identifiable error that clearly does not influence the outcome of 
the trial does not justify the expenditure of additional public 
resources that would be required to retry a case. As the Eighth 
Circuit has previously acknowledged, however, some errors affect the 
framework of the trial—and not merely the manner in which it 
proceeds121—and thus do not fit nicely into harmless error analysis. 
The Court held that denial of counsel of choice cannot be 
remedied through harmless error analysis.122 According to the Court, 
the principle that separates errors subject to harmless error review 
from errors that require automatic reversal is the “difficulty of 
assessing the effect of the error.”123 Based on this standard, the 
Court had “little trouble” concluding that the erroneous denial of 
 
 117. Id. at 2563 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970)). 
 118. Id. (“Having derived the right to effective representation from the purpose of 
ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from that 
same purpose.”). 
 119. See id. Some argue that even indigent defendants should have a right to more than 
effective assistance of counsel. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in 
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1043–45 (2006) (summarizing 
research that reveals the inadequacy of indigent defense); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The 
Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 435 (1992). This Note 
does not discuss this topic, although Gonzalez-Lopez, in strengthening the right to counsel of 
choice, could have the effect of encouraging reforms that provide more meaningful 
representation for indigent defendants. 
 120. Id. at 2564 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991)). 
 121. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 122. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2566. 
 123. Id. at 2564 n.4. 
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counsel of choice warrants automatic reversal.124 The Court 
identified several factors that complicate harmless error analysis, 
including the ambiguous effect of attorney differences in trial 
strategy, defense theory, jury selection, and witness examination.125 
The impact of these differences would be difficult to determine; 
indeed, such a determination would be tantamount to an “inquiry 
into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.”126 Due to 
the difficulty of assessing the impact of the error, the Court held that 
erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice requires automatic 
reversal.127 
Thus, the majority twice refused to subject the denial of counsel 
of choice to some form of prejudice analysis grounded in concepts of 
fairness. First, it identified the right to counsel of choice as an 
absolute right with merit in itself, regardless of its purpose in 
ensuring fairness. Second, the Court refused to subject the violation 
of that right to harmless error analysis because of the difficulty of 
assessing the impact of the error on the trial. In both instances, it 
used categorical rules to protect the rights of the defendant. 
3. Dissent’s characterization of the Sixth Amendment right: Assistance 
The dissent emphasized the purpose of the Sixth Amendment—
fairness—and would have used fairness to assess a violation of the 
defendant’s right to counsel of choice and the remedy for that 
violation.128 In coming to its conclusion, the dissent focused on the 
text of the Constitution and the purpose attributed to the text in 
precedent. According to the dissent, the key word in the Assistance 
of Counsel Clause is assistance—meaning that the quality of 
assistance should be the touchstone of constitutionality.129 The actual 
text provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”130 Given this language, the 
dissent found it more legitimate to focus on the assistance the 
accused should receive, not on the identity of counsel.131 Under this 
 
 124. Id. at 2564. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 2565. 
 127. Id. at 2564–65. 
 128. Id. at 2567 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 2566. 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 131. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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reading, the Sixth Amendment would grant the “right to have the 
assistance that the defendant’s counsel of choice is able to 
provide,”132 not the absolute right to choose who will represent the 
defendant. 
The dissent also argued that the historical and legal development 
of the Sixth Amendment supports this focus on assistance. The 
purpose of the Amendment was to counter the English common law 
rule that limited the ability of a felony defendant to be represented 
by counsel.133 To achieve this purpose, a defendant need not have 
counsel of choice, but only such assistance as will ensure fairness. 
Although at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
defendants chose their own counsel, this was necessarily the case 
because “the availability of appointed counsel was generally limited  
. . . .”134 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the history of the 
Sixth Amendment does not require that a defendant receive 
assistance from counsel of choice. 
In addition, case law outlines limitations on the right to counsel 
of choice, and these limitations indicate an emphasis on assistance as 
opposed to choice.135 The right to choose has never been absolute; 
many considerations can overcome the defendant’s choice of 
counsel, including court eligibility rules, conflict-of-interest rules, 
and court scheduling considerations.136 These extraneous limitations 
“are tolerable because the focus of the right is the quality of the 
representation . . . not the identity of the attorney . . . .”137 The 
limitations on counsel of choice indicate that the Amendment 
cannot inexorably guarantee a defendant’s choice of counsel.138 
Even apart from the limits to the right to counsel, case law extols 
the Sixth Amendment as a protection of fairness, not of the 
defendant’s choice. The Amendment “assure[s] fairness in the 
adversary criminal process”139 and was not intended “to ensure that a 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2566–67 (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973)). 
 134. Id. at 2567. 
 135. Id. at 2567–68. 
 136. Id. (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 2567–68. 
 138. Id. (“These limitations on the right to counsel of choice are tolerable because the 
focus of the right is the quality of the representation that the defendant receives, not the 
identity of the attorney who provides the representation.”). 
 139. Id. at 2567 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)). 
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defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he 
prefers.”140 Given this emphasis, the dissent thought it unreasonable 
to accord too much deference to a defendant’s first choice when 
deciding whether the defendant must show prejudice to make the 
violation complete.141 On the contrary, the emphasis on fairness 
implies that a defendant should show some defect in the assistance 
received in order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation. Thus, the 
dissent reasoned that no violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs 
unless a court error “diminishes the quality of assistance that the 
defendant would have otherwise received.”142 The defendant could 
receive a new trial by identifying a difference between the 
representation received and that of disqualified counsel.143 
4. Dissent’s remedy: A defendant must show prejudice 
Given that the dissent would require an “identifiable 
difference”144 in the quality of representation before finding a 
constitutional violation, it would have no need to evaluate whether 
that violation would be subject to harmless error review or automatic 
reversal, because the test for violation already incorporates the 
principles of harmless error review. Yet, assuming (as the majority 
decided) that erroneous deprivation of counsel alone violates the 
Constitution, the dissent still would subject that violation to 
harmless error review before granting the defendant a new trial.145 
This result follows from the rareness of automatic reversal as a 
 
 140. Id. (“[W]e reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful 
relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 159 (1983) and citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983))). One scholar 
recognized a problem with unchecked counsel of choice: that an attorney may develop such a 
close relationship with a client that she or he may yield ethical considerations to the needs of 
the client. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 670, 686–87 (1992). The Court’s hesitancy to recognize a relational right in the Sixth 
Amendment may stem from this concern. 
 141. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2568. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Notably, the standard proposed by Justice Alito would apparently require less 
showing of prejudice than an ineffective assistance of counsel claim within the meaning of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), which requires a defendant to show “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” 
 144. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2568 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriquez v. 
Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 145. Id. at 2570. 
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remedy and the absurd results that would follow from subjecting the 
denial of counsel of choice to automatic reversal.146 
According to the dissent, automatic reversal is reserved for errors 
that involve fundamental unfairness, and the denial of counsel of 
choice does not rise to that level.147 Although the majority 
characterized automatic reversal as being appropriate whenever the 
effect of the error is difficult to determine,148 the dissent focused on 
the nature of the error.149 Only where the error was one that would 
“render a trial fundamentally unfair” should a court grant automatic 
reversal.150 Denial of counsel of choice does not involve this high 
level of fundamental unfairness because the defendant often chooses 
counsel unwittingly; furthermore, quality of representation often 
does not differ between first- and second-choice counsel.151 The 
dissent admitted that equivalent representation would not justify the 
denial of the right to choice of counsel, but the high likelihood of 
fair representation should “inform the remedy.”152 
The dissent also thought that absurd results follow from the 
automatic reversal of erroneous denials of counsel of choice.153 To 
require retrial in cases where no prejudice resulted creates a 
significant burden on the resources of the courts.154 The dissent 
estimated that there would be many situations in which a second-
choice attorney would actually provide better assistance than the 
counsel of first choice; or at any rate, the trial judge would know that 
any difference in trial strategy did not affect the trial outcome.155 The 
dissent thought this judicial determination was well within the 
competence of the courts.156 Significantly, when a court cannot 
 
 146. See id. at 2569–71. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See supra Part III. 
 149. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2569 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)); see also id. at 2570 
(“The touchstone of structural error is fundamental unfairness and unreliability.”). 
 151. Id. at 2569. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 2570. 
 154. See id. at 2571 (“The consequences of the majority’s holding are particularly severe 
in the federal system and in other court systems that do not allow a defendant to take an 
interlocutory appeal when counsel is disqualified . . . . [I]f an appellate court concludes that the 
trial judge made a marginally incorrect ruling in applying its own pro hac vice rules, the 
appellate court has no alternative but to order a new trial . . . .”). 
 155. Id. at 2570. 
 156. Id. 
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clearly discern the effect of the denial, the prosecution would have a 
hard time proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.157 Thus, even if erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice 
violated the Sixth Amendment—without any showing of prejudice—
automatic reversal required such a showing because the right in 
question did not involve the categorical unfairness requisite to 
granting automatic reversal. 
The difference between the majority and dissent reveals divergent 
understandings of the right to counsel of choice, and these views 
found voice in the respective opinions on how courts should 
administer the right. The majority favored clear rules that would 
indicate when the right was violated and what the remedy should 
be.158 The dissent, on the other hand, would allow judges to use 
discretion to determine whether a Sixth Amendment violation 
occurred and whether that violation warranted a new trial.159 
Although both opinions rooted their analysis in the text of the Sixth 
Amendment,160 each came to a different conclusion. This stark 
difference in result, with both views framing analysis around the text 
of the Constitution, indicates a methodological difference at play,161 
and warrants further discussion and exploration. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The fact that history, precedent, and constitutional text did not 
clearly lead to the outcome in Gonzalez-Lopez suggests that deeper 
methodological approaches of the Justices led to the divergent 
outcomes of the majority and dissenting opinions. In particular, 
Justice Scalia favors bright-line rules and limiting judicial 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. at 2564–65. 
 159. See id. at 2569–71. 
 160. See id. at 2561, 2566. Indeed, the textual foundation for analysis is of great 
importance to textualists like Justice Scalia. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) (“It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands 
and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have 
in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the 
basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.”); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1132 
(1996) (noting the importance of beginning with the text and sticking close to it). 
 161. One author has pointed out that methodology increasingly matters in the 
disposition of criminal cases. See Barkow, supra note 102, at 1077. The analysis that follows 
seems to vindicate that hypothesis. 
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discretion,162 and that overarching methodology likely played a key 
role in the outcome of this case. Although this methodological 
preference influenced the majority opinion, other factors provide 
independent justification for the bright-line rule. This Part analyzes 
the approach of Jeffrey L. Fisher, as well as the academic literature 
that addresses the merits and shortcomings of bright-line rules in the 
criminal procedure context, in a search for other principles that 
justify the use of a bright-line rule in this case. Fisher’s constitutional 
choice analysis attempts to provide a textual justification for bright-
line rules. This neutral analysis, however, does not fully explain the 
use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. Other factors specific to 
the criminal procedure context provide independent justification for 
the Court’s treatment of the right to counsel of choice. The Court’s 
experience with criminal procedure makes a bright-line rule more 
reliable than in other contexts; the important rights at stake implicate 
a greater need for formalism; and the static nature of the criminal 
trial means that a rule laid down today will not need modification 
tomorrow. Given the strength of these factors, this Part concludes 
that the bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez does not rely solely on a 
methodological preference for bright-line rules and limited judicial 
discretion. 
A. Procedural Rule Not Mandated by Precedent 
Both opinions proffered several factors in favor of their respective 
approaches, yet neither opinion could definitively state that the 
Constitution mandated the decision. Two pragmatic factors—
interpretive consistency and generous construction of rights—
support the majority approach; the dissent’s approach, on the other 
hand, relies on history, recent judicial trends, judicial efficiency, and 
considerations of fairness.163 The analysis below concludes that 
substantive constitutional doctrine did not mandate a procedural 
safeguard in this case. 
Interestingly, had the Court adopted the analysis of the Eighth 
Circuit, it could have found greater substantive backing for its 
procedural rule. The Eighth Circuit said that the Sixth Amendment 
entailed not only fairness, but also a defendant’s right to free choice 
 
 162. See supra note 36. 
 163. See infra notes 169–79 and accompanying text. 
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in shaping the method of defense.164 By recognizing such an 
autonomy interest, the Supreme Court could have bolstered its 
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s 
choice of counsel, not merely effective assistance of counsel.165 The 
Court, however, declined to do so.166 Instead, it accepted the 
government’s argument that the Sixth Amendment’s purpose is to 
ensure a fair trial.167 The majority only differed from the dissent in its 
method of ensuring fairness: it held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires a “particular guarantee of fairness”—the right to choice of 
counsel.168 
Perhaps the strongest factor in favor of the majority approach is 
that it distinguishes between the Sixth Amendment and due 
process;169 yet, even conceding the need to draw such a distinction, 
the majority approach does not necessarily follow. The majority 
 
 164. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 934–35 (2005) (“The criminal 
defendant’s right to select the attorney of his choice to represent him, like the right to self-
representation, derives from the Sixth Amendment principle wherein the defendant has the 
right to decide the type of defense he will mount.” (citing United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 
52, 56 (1979))); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (recognizing an 
autonomy interest behind the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation). 
 165. The Court had the autonomy argument before it, not only as raised by the lower 
court, but also in the respondent’s brief. See Brief for the Respondent at 23–24, 39–40, United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352). In addition, the Court 
addressed the autonomy interest at oral argument, where “autonomy” was mentioned over 
twenty times, mainly in response to questions by Justices Souter and Stevens. Transcript of 
Oral Argument, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-352 
.pdf [hereinafter Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript]. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia, who 
wrote for the majority, made no reference to an autonomy interest in the opinion, and did not 
use the word “autonomy” during oral argument. See id. 
 166. The Court did state that the defendant has a right “to choose who will represent 
him,” but did not discuss the interests that supported that right. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 
2561 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). 
 167. Id. at 2562. (“It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in that 
Amendment is to ensure a fair trial . . . .”). The Court could have recognized an autonomy 
interest behind the right to assistance of counsel. It had done so in interpreting other aspects 
of the Sixth Amendment. See Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and 
Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
397, 410 (2000) (“While the Court has alluded to three values—trial fairness, substantive 
privacy interests, and respecting the autonomy of the accused—as reflected in the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, close consideration of the Court’s work makes clear that the 
fairness and autonomy interests are the primary, and perhaps the only, values presently 
bottoming the right to counsel.”). 
 168. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562. 
 169. See id. 
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forcefully argued that the Sixth Amendment should not collapse into 
an effective assistance of counsel analysis.170 It argued that the right 
to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel arose 
separately and from different sources, and should therefore not 
converge.171 This would suggest that erroneous denial of chosen 
counsel completes the violation.  
It does not follow, however, that the violation requires automatic 
reversal, for in requiring harmless error analysis before granting a 
new trial, the Court would not collapse the right to counsel into the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. The two rights would differ in 
the ease with which the prosecution could prove harmlessness:172 if, 
as the majority asserted, a court would have difficulty assessing the 
prejudicial effect of deprivation of counsel,173 this ambiguity would 
make the prosecution’s argument for harmlessness very difficult. 
Unlike the harmless error analysis associated with an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim—where the prosecution can point to the 
harmlessness of the specific errors upon which the defendant 
brought the ineffective assistance claim174—the uncertain effect of 
the denial of counsel of choice would make it difficult for the 
prosecution to meet the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
A second factor favoring the majority approach is that it creates a 
windfall for the criminal defendant. Many argue that the Court 
should liberally construe the criminal rights protected by the 
Constitution because political processes will not fill that role.175 In 
light of this anti-majoritarian role, perhaps a mechanical rule better 
protects a defendant’s rights. Although this argument has merit, it 
does not show that the remedy for the violation of the right to 
counsel must be automatic reversal. The Court could protect a 
defendant’s right from the heat of passion that can accompany public 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2563. 
 172. See id. at 2569–70 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, when the effect of an 
erroneous disqualification is hard to gauge, the prosecution will be unable to meet its burden 
of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 173. See id. at 2565 (majority opinion). 
 174. See id. at 2570 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 175. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 10, at 1180 (“[Courts’] most significant roles, in our 
system, are to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occasional excesses of [the] 
popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are 
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will.”). 
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trials by finding a violation of the right upon erroneous deprivation. 
Then, on appeal, the defendant would have his or her rights 
vindicated in a more dispassionate forum, with the government 
carrying a heavy burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Only then would a defendant be denied a new trial. 
Thus, it is not clear that precedent or constitutional 
considerations mandated the Court’s bright-line rule.176 Indeed, the 
dissent’s balancing approach had significant merit in this case. The 
dissent’s approach would reconcile the history of the Sixth 
Amendment with Wheat’s recent focus on fairness. In another, but 
unrelated, aspect of fairness, the balancing approach would recognize 
the inequity of allowing wealthy defendants a new trial upon 
erroneous denial of first choice of counsel, while indigent defendants 
have no right to choose their counsel and must show prejudice to 
their defense in order to gain any redress for the mistakes of 
appointed counsel.177 Most significantly, the dissent’s approach 
would recognize the importance of criminal rights, but also give 
greater recognition to judicial efficiency as a competing interest. A 
balancing approach could save the expense of a new trial when 
choice of counsel had no effect on the outcome of the 
proceedings.178 The majority’s categorical approach refused to 
recognize these interests, instead requiring automatic reversal—
“strong medicine” that should only be used sparingly.179 
 
 176. On the inadequacy of grounding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on analyses of 
history and precedent, see Amar, supra note 160, at 1127 (“[P]recedent alone cannot guide 
the way—even for those Justices who steer by precedent as their polestar—because precedent 
in this field is so regularly contradictory or perverse.”). 
 177. Michael R. Dreeben, The Right To Present a Twinkie Defense, 9 GREEN BAG 347, 
352 (2006). Gonzalez-Lopez does not bid well for the indigent criminal defendant’s perception 
of fairness: 
[E]ven if the Court cannot, through its decisions, equalize justice for the rich and 
poor, it also need not . . . poke a finger in the eye of indigent criminal defendants. 
Imagine this statement to the typical indigent defendant: “If you have incompetent, 
or conflicted, or lethargic, or grossly inexperienced counsel, you have no ground for 
complaint unless you can show that competent counsel would have created a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome. But if only you were rich! Then, a 
denial of your first-choice counsel would be the golden road to a new trial.” 
Id. 
 178. Indeed, granting automatic reversal in all cases, without consideration of the public 
expense associated with a new trial, arguably creates “[a] poor fit between doctrine and the real 
world.” See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 953. 
 179. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2570 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Given that a bright-line rule can impair judicial efficiency and 
that precedent did not mandate the rule, some other factor must 
have influenced the Court’s decision to apply the bright-line rule. In 
searching for such a factor, relevant legal scholarship should be 
considered, including that of Jeffrey L. Fisher, the successful 
advocate in Crawford, Blakely, and Gonzalez-Lopez. The following 
discussion evaluates whether Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis 
adequately explains the use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez 
and examines other factors that might explain the Court’s holding. 
B. Searching for the Basis of the Bright-Line Rule 
Fisher outlines several factors that could lean toward the 
application of a bright-line rule, including originalism, considerations 
of administrability, and the enforcement of constitutional choices.180 
Under Fisher’s analysis, the difference between constitutional choices 
and constitutional values best explains the Court’s recent use of 
categorical rules and he analyzes Crawford and Blakely to vindicate 
this hypothesis.181 He does this by first showing that originalism and 
administrability do not account for the rules adopted in those cases. 
He then applies his constitutional choice analysis to determine when 
the Court should apply a procedural rule, and concludes that his 
analysis explains the results reached in Crawford and Blakely.182 This 
analysis does not, however, explain the Court’s use of a bright-line 
rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. 
1. Originalism: An unlikely support for bright-line rules 
Fisher suggests that although originalism informs the Court as to 
the nature of the right in question, originalism will not determine 
whether that right should be enforced through a bright-line rule or a 
balancing test.183 An originalist defense of categorical rules would 
suggest that the Framers placed criminal procedure guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights in order to prevent judges from balancing away those 
rights.184 Although Fisher acknowledges that the Bill of Rights 
protects against the erosion of common law rights, he believes that 
 
 180. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1516–28. 
 181. See id. at 1523–28. 
 182. See id. at 1516–28. 
 183. Id. at 1518. 
 184. Id. at 1516–17; see also Black, supra note 9, at 874–75. 
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bright-line rules are not absolutely necessary for the protection of 
rights.185 “The leap from the Framers’ general intentions to the 
means of implementing them is simply too great.”186 
The majority in Gonzalez-Lopez did not attempt to make the leap 
from the general intentions of the Framers to a requirement for a 
bright-line rule. The Court instead harkened to principle; it was 
unwilling to abstract the purpose of fairness from the right to 
counsel and then eliminate the right.187 The Court also supported its 
holding by distinguishing the right to counsel of choice from the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, rooting the right to counsel of 
choice in the longstanding practice of allowing defendants to choose 
their counsel.188 The right to effective assistance, on the other hand, 
originated from an understanding that fairness required a baseline 
standard of attorney performance.189 The Court, however, did not 
argue that the historical understanding mandated the bright-line rule 
adopted,190 but that harmless error review would confuse the right to 
counsel with the right to effective assistance of counsel.191 
 
 185. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1517 (“[I]t is one thing to say that the Framers intended to 
install bulwarks against erosion and another to say that they intended bulwarks to segregate 
only by kind and never by degree. A dam can still be effective while letting some water pass 
through.”). 
 186. Id. at 1517. But see Barkow, supra note 102, at 1072–73 (arguing that originalism 
sometimes dictates the categorical enforcement of rights); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and 
Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of 
Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 201–03 (2005) (recognizing originalism and 
formalism as driving the bright-line rule in Crawford, but only formalism compelling a bright-
line rule in Blakely). 
 187. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006) (quoting 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 188. See id. at 2563 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Andersen 
v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898); and BEANEY, supra note 44, at 18–24, 27–33). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Indeed, Justice Scalia may not have garnered the necessary votes for a majority if he 
had based his analysis on original understanding, given that at least one Justice that joined his 
opinion does not favor that basis of decision. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 249 (2002) (“The more literal judges may hope to find, in language, 
history, tradition, and precedent, objective interpretive standards; they may seek to avoid an 
interpretive subjectivity that could confuse a judge’s personal idea of what is good for that 
which the Constitution demands; and they may believe that these ‘original’ sources more 
readily will yield rules that can guide other institutions, including lower courts. These 
objectives are desirable, but I do not think the literal approach will achieve them, and, in any 
event, the constitutional price is too high.”). 
 191. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563 (“To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to 
counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative 
BRIGGS.FIN.DOC 4/5/2007 11:17:18 AM 
531] Gonzalez v. Lopez and Its Bright-Line Rule 
 563 
Historical records often lead to conflicting conclusions as to 
whether a bright-line rule should apply. Indeed, in the Gonzalez-
Lopez dissent, Justice Alito looked at the purpose of the right to 
counsel and argued that “Assistance of Counsel” focuses on 
assistance, not on the “identity of the provider.”192 The Amendment 
ensured fairness by limiting the English common law rule that 
denied a felony defendant the right to assistance of counsel.193 As 
further evidence that the historical record can lead to different 
conclusions, the dissent—in arguing that the Clause ensured fairness, 
not that a defendant would “inexorably be represented by the lawyer 
whom he prefers”—quoted one of the same interpretive cases that 
the majority cited in support of its decision.194 Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez 
seems to vindicate Fisher’s hesitancy to use originalism to explain the 
use of bright-line rules. The majority opinion did not attempt to 
base its holding on originalism, and the analysis of the dissenting 
opinion revealed the inadequacy of an attempt to do so. Originalism 
does not explain the Court’s use of a bright-line rule here. 
2. Administrability: Not a factor in Gonzalez-Lopez 
On then to administrability, wherein Fisher argues that although 
a need for predictability encourages the use of bright-line rules, it 
does not fully justify their use.195 Where rights are at stake, one 
might argue that constitutional provisions should provide “clear ex 
ante guidance and prove administrable in the courts.”196 In this 
regard, there are many situations in which defendants, police officers, 
prosecutors, and courts need to know how to structure their conduct 
 
effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of 
competence on whatever lawyer is chosen or appointed.”). 
 192. Id. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 193. See id. at 2566–67. 
 194. Id. at 2567 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). As to the 
conflicting conclusions that can be drawn from the historical record, see supra Part II, which 
shows that on the one hand, the record indicates that the right to counsel was intended to 
ensure a fair trial; on the other hand, the provision was intended to take away the ability of 
judges to limit that right. Both sides can rely on such evidence to inform their respective 
opinions. 
 195. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1518–21. 
 196. Id. at 1519; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–63 (1992) (recognizing the importance of certainty and predictability, 
but warning that such certainty can allow the “bad man” to engage in reprehensible behavior 
right up to the well-defined line). 
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in carrying out the processes surrounding criminal prosecution.197 
Administrability has particular importance for Sixth Amendment 
rights because courts deal with these rights on a daily basis.198 
Although the frequent surfacing of Sixth Amendment rights 
usually creates a need for predictability, such a need did not support 
the use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez because courts rarely 
have occasion to deny a defendant’s counsel of choice. At oral 
argument, the Court discussed the rarity of these cases, and Fisher 
suggested that less than one such case reaches the federal courts of 
appeal each year.199 In short, wrongful denial of counsel of choice 
does not occur frequently enough to warrant a bright-line rule for 
administrability purposes. 
Thus, administrability cannot explain the Court’s use of a bright-
line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. Indeed, according to Fisher, the need for 
administrability, even where applicable, only frames the question of 
what type of rule to apply.200 Given that originalism and 
administrability fail to explain the Court’s use of a bright-line rule, 
the discussion below considers the guidepost identified by Fisher: the 
difference between constitutional values and constitutional choices. 
3. Categorical enforcement of constitutional choices 
Fisher’s guidepost separates constitutional choices from 
constitutional values, and if applicable, may serve as a decisive factor 
in a court’s decision between bright-line rules and balancing tests. 
His rule says that “[w]hen the Constitution makes a choice instead 
of identifying a value, that choice must be categorically enforced.”201 
In other words, the Constitution makes a “choice” when its text 
prescribes the procedure by which a court should protect the right. 
Although many procedures are apparent on first reading, Fisher 
identifies a textual tool for situations of less clarity: determine 
 
 197. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1519. 
 198. See, e.g., id. at 1520 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). 
 199. Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript, supra note 165, at 45. 
 200. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1521 (“In fact, [administrability] really only frames [our 
inquiry], because a need for easily administrable constitutional doctrine does not always lead to 
categorical rules.”). Fisher goes on to note situations in which constitutional rights are at issue, 
but the Court has refused to adjudicate the rights by means of bright-line rules. Id. at 1521–
22. 
 201. Id. at 1522. 
BRIGGS.FIN.DOC 4/5/2007 11:17:18 AM 
531] Gonzalez v. Lopez and Its Bright-Line Rule 
 565 
whether the right is phrased as a noun or as an adjective.202 Nouns 
indicate choices, while adjectives imply values.203 
The recent example in Crawford provides an illustration of the 
categorical enforcement of a constitutional value. In Crawford, the 
Court faced a constitutional text that granted a defendant the right 
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”204 The Court 
decided that only a procedural right to formally confront testimonial 
evidence could satisfy the demands of the Constitution, because 
“[t]he Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the 
reliability of testimony in criminal trials . . . .”205 That is, since the 
text of the Constitution describes a procedure (confrontation) by 
which the defendant can challenge the evidence that witnesses bring 
forward, courts must honor that “choice” by refusing to balance the 
criminal defendant’s interest in confrontation against society’s 
interest in justice or efficiency. 206 
The question then, in relation to the right to counsel of choice, 
is whether the text “Assistance of Counsel” represents a 
constitutional “choice” that a defendant is entitled to a certain 
attorney or, in the alternative, a guarantee that the defendant will 
have the assistance necessary to carry out an effective defense. The 
text, by enumerating “Assistance” and “of Counsel,” lends some 
credibility to the idea that the Constitution prefigures a role for 
counsel of choice. Indeed, if the Clause really only focuses on 
“Assistance,” there would be little need for the modifier “of 
Counsel.” To avoid attributing redundancy to the text, one must 
acknowledge some importance of the role of counsel. 
 
 202. Id. at 1523. 
 203. Fisher analyzes several nouns and adjectives and their constitutional treatment: 
A process either constitutes “confrontation,” or it doesn’t. A decision maker is 
either a “jury,” or it isn’t. A person is either put into “jeopardy,” or she isn’t. On 
the other hand, deciding whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” is a matter of 
gradation and requires a balancing of interests. The same goes for deciding whether 
a trial is “speedy”; whether punishment is “cruel”; whether bail or fines are 
“excessive”; and whether process is “due.” 
Id. 
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 205. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
 206. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1524 (“The Sixth Amendment chooses ‘confrontation’ 
as the means of testing witness testimony; it provides no qualifier inviting, or allowing, courts 
to balance the utility of that procedure against competing interests.”). 
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Even considering that counsel should play some role, it is not 
clear that the text mandates that a defendant choose the identity of 
counsel. In the text, “Assistance” comes first and arguably bears the 
greatest weight in the phrase. “Counsel” merely specifies the form in 
which the assistance comes. It requires an inference not present in 
the text to find that “of Counsel” not only invites the use of counsel, 
but also prescribes counsel of choice as the necessary vehicle for 
attaining “Assistance of Counsel.”207 The text does not clearly 
indicate a constitutional choice that must be enforced through a 
bright-line rule. Thus, Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does 
not provide an unquestionable explanation of the Court’s decision in 
Gonzalez-Lopez. Although the text prescribes a method (assistance of 
counsel) for ensuring fairness, it does not prescribe counsel of choice 
as the necessary means. 
As a result, Fisher’s rule does not affirmatively bridge the 
interpretive divide between the majority and dissent. In addition, 
neither originalism nor a need for administrability justifies the 
Court’s imposition of a bright-line rule. The majority applied a 
bright-line rule after considering the traditional practice of allowing 
defendants to choose counsel and the perceived problem of merging 
the right to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel.208 
The dissent considered the purpose of the Clause and also made 
pragmatic arguments for harmless error review.209 The analysis to this 
point has not provided convincing evidence that the majority’s 
bright-line rule arose out of considerations independent of a 
preference for bright-line rules and limiting judicial discretion. 
C. Naked Preference for Procedural Rules? 
If considerations independent of broad judicial philosophies 
cannot justify the application of a procedural rule, then the 
discussion returns to the bright-line rule/balancing test battle-
grounds, with each side lauding the merits of its approach.210 Further 
probing indicates that where ambiguity exists as to what the text 
 
 207. Indeed, the Constitution would best protect the right to counsel of choice by using 
the words “Assistance of Counsel of Choice.” On the other hand, little discussion attended the 
incorporation, adoption, or ratification of the Counsel Clause. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 208. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
 210. See discussion supra Part I. 
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demands, the Court should apply the bright-line rule in criminal 
procedure. Indeed, Fisher persuasively suggests this approach in 
criminal procedure cases,211 and he supports that position by 
pointing out the Court’s ability to create reliable rules of criminal 
procedure,212 the greater need for formalism,213 and the relative 
constancy of the criminal trial process.214 Thus, even if originalism, 
administrability, or constitutional choice analysis do not explain the 
Court’s use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, the unique 
characteristics of criminal procedure weigh in favor of bright-line 
rules. A brief discussion of this additional analysis follows, as applied 
to the Court’s choice to protect the right to counsel of choice with a 
categorical rule. 
First, the Court’s experience with criminal trial procedure weighs 
in favor of using bright-line rules to protect criminal rights.215 The 
members of the Court have direct and often extensive experience 
with trial proceedings and know the contours of criminal trials. 
Thus, one of the principal objections to bright-line rules—that the 
Court lacks adequate experience to lay down a law that will bind 
future courts—drops out of the analysis.216 With the right to counsel 
of choice, judges see daily manifestations of the important role of 
counsel in the presentation of a defense217 and understand the 
intangible but pivotal role of counsel in the trial.218 During oral 
 
 211. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531 (“[A] general appreciation for the different natures of 
constitutional criminal procedure and substantive rights suggests three normative reasons why 
balancing is more likely to be dangerous to the essence of criminal procedure rights than to 
other rights.”); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and 
Standards, 1991 BYU L. REV. 351, 356–58 (discussing the rule-based nature of criminal law). 
 212. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1534–35. 
 213. Id. at 1531. 
 214. Id. at 1535. 
 215. Id. at 1534–35. 
 216. Id. at 1534 (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 209, 255 and Pierre J. Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 424–25 (1985)). The risk associated with laying down 
a rule binding future courts is that it may not adequately address future situations, and 
therefore the rule will lead to individuals “being sacrificed on the altar of rules.” Sullivan, supra 
note 196, at 66. 
 217. For a detailed enumeration of the tactical differences attorneys may legitimately 
pursue, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in 
Support of Respondent at 5–7, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) 
(No. 05-352). 
 218. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Attorneys are not 
fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges. Attorneys may differ as to their trial strategy, their 
oratory style, or the importance they give to particular legal issues. These differences, all within 
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argument, Justice Scalia acknowledged the unique role of counsel 
when he suggested that mere competence is often not enough; a 
defendant wants to hire the lawyer who will present the “Twinkie 
defense”: the defense tactic, though seemingly absurd, that will win 
the case.219 The Justices on the Court have enough experience with 
criminal trials to know that choice of counsel matters and that a 
court has no way of knowing how counsel, chosen by a defendant 
but denied by a court, could have influenced the jury. 
Some may argue that even when the Court’s experience creates 
confidence in a bright-line rule, the Court should avoid a bright-line 
rule because the mandatory nature of the rule deemphasizes the 
values underlying the rule.220 Such an argument suggests that the 
Court’s bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez would limit a lower 
court’s analysis of the fairness values underlying the right to counsel 
of choice, and this under-analysis would diminish the quality of 
justice administered. Although the argument in general has merit, in 
this case the very analysis that the argument advocates—that of 
whether a violation of the right to counsel of choice triggers 
fundamental unfairness221—involves sufficient uncertainty as to 
betray confidence in the outcome of the analysis222 and thus 
undermine concepts of fairness. In this situation, harmless error 
review involves a level of uncertainty that would itself be 
fundamentally unfair to a defendant’s constitutional rights. 
 
the range of effective and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of a 
defense.” (quoting United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979))). 
 219. Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript, supra note 165, at 17 (“I want a lawyer who will invent 
the Twinkie defense. . . . I want a lawyer who’s going to win for me . . . and the criterion for 
winning is not how competent is the lawyer necessarily.”). 
 220. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and 
Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 115 (2005) (“I think it is fair to 
say that the Court’s emphasis on formalism in its interpretation of the Bill of Rights distracted 
it from specifying normative constitutional values in the criminal procedure arena . . . .”); see 
also Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process 
School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 159 (2005) (“[J]ustices who turn away from [an open-
ended analysis of fairness] because they fear subjectivity are not likely to take a normative 
approach to the provisions in the Bill of Rights.”). 
 221. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2569 (2006) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that automatic reversal is reserved for errors that involve fundamental 
unfairness).  
 222. See id. at 2564–65 (2006) (majority opinion). 
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Second, formalism223 is arguably more essential to criminal 
procedure than other areas of law.224 As a practical matter, a court 
approaches a very different task when depriving a person of life or 
liberty than in many cases that deal with property. In the former 
situation, the government exercises its “most awesome powers”225 
and affects the individual in ways that have no parallel among 
society’s other institutions.226 A fair government, in exercising these 
powers, would establish clear ground rules by which it acts, “lest the 
siren song of administrative convenience” overcome the 
government’s obligation to seriously consider the impact of 
impairing individual liberty.227 One disturbing feature of that siren 
song is that the most egregious crimes cause the greatest cry for 
convenience, making the need to protect criminal rights even 
stronger.228 Bright-line rules help to preserve the criminal rights 
 
 223. Formalism involves the “concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (emphasis added). For a compilation of 
other definitions of formalism, see id. at 510 n.1. Admittedly, formalism shares certain 
similarities with administrability. Considerations of formalism and administrability can both vie 
for bright-line or procedural rules. For purposes of this Note, however, different interests 
underlie each. Administrability weighs in favor of a bright-line rule because that rule serves the 
efficiency interests of the courts. Formalism, on the other hand, supports a bright-line rule 
because that rule protects the individual liberty of the defendant. The interest in 
administrability can be satisfied by any clear rule, regardless of its content; with formalism, 
however, the content of the rule matters. 
 224. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 149–55; Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and 
the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1037–40 (2006); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531. For 
an analysis of Crawford and Blakely in light of the need for formalism in criminal procedure, 
see Bibas, supra note 186. 
 225. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531. 
 226. Government control over property, on the other hand, does have institutional 
analogues: parents control property interests of children, an employer may deprive a worker of 
the opportunity to work, and a church may deprive a member of the benefits of membership, 
to name a few. None of these institutions, however, has the authority to deprive an individual 
of life or personal liberty. 
 227. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004) (“Vague standards are manipulable, and, while that might be a small concern in run-of-
the-mill assault prosecutions like this one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged 
cases like Raleigh’s—great state trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels 
of the judiciary might not be so clear.”); David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on 
Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 241, 242 (2001). 
 228. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531–32 (“Discovering who killed a police officer—not to 
mention, as the Framers might have posited, discovering who conspired violently to overthrow 
the government—is more important than discovering who stole a slice of pizza. Therefore, a 
flexible approach to criminal procedure rights is likely to make them vanish precisely when 
passions are at their highest, and when those procedures are most important.”). 
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guaranteed by the Constitution by ensuring a fair process that does 
not give way to the exigencies of majoritarian interest.229 
This reasoning also applies to the right to counsel of choice: a 
defendant facing the force of majoritarian will can best enjoy the 
“Assistance of Counsel” when that right is protected by a bright-line 
rule. Given that judges know the importance of the interaction 
between counsel and the jury, a judge could be tempted to find a 
reason to deny a defendant’s chosen counsel in order to stack the 
cards against a defendant or level the playing field vis-à-vis a 
prosecutor who connects less effectively with a jury.230 In addition, 
given that most cases do not go to trial, uncertainty with regard to a 
defendant’s right to retain superb counsel could impair the 
defendant’s ability to bargain for a reduced charge.  
Of course, a formal rule must represent the assimilation of 
reasoned principles to have any legitimacy,231 but in Gonzalez-Lopez, 
the Court outlined the principles upon which it decided to apply a 
formal rule protecting the defendant’s right to counsel of choice.232 
Although a formal rule can obscure the process by which a Court 
reaches a conclusion,233 Gonzalez-Lopez confirms that such 
 
 229. Although the political process can also undermine any procedural protection the 
Court grants while acting in its anti-majoritarian role, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54–55 
(1997), this does not give cause to abandon the anti-majoritarian role; indeed, it only makes 
the role more vital. 
 230. The formal rule of Gonzalez-Lopez means that automatic reversal occurs upon denial 
of counsel. Of course, that does not necessarily translate into more generous protection of the 
right to counsel of choice, because lower courts may simply find that counsel was not 
wrongfully denied (as in Wheat, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 70–82). 
Although it is true that the bright-line rule of Gonzalez-Lopez does not remove all judicial 
discretion from the administration of the right, it adds formality to that right. Most 
importantly, it formally declares the meaning of the Constitution. Formalism need not cover 
the entire ground in order to exert a positive influence in protecting rights. 
 231. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial 
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 157–58 (2003) (“Bright line rules that are not 
principled provide neither guidance for law enforcement in dealing with the next case nor 
protection for citizens.”). 
 232. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006). 
 233. See Schauer, supra note 223, at 514 (stating that formalism “obscures that choice 
and thus obstructs questions of how [a rule] was made and whether it could have been made 
differently”); see also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in 
the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a judge to take full 
responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives 
at them—more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of hallowed 
abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective history.”). 
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obfuscation need not occur if the Court acknowledges the basis 
upon which it holds.234 
Finally, the relative constancy of the trial process also weighs in 
favor of using bright-line rules to protect criminal rights. In many 
contexts, the Court should hesitate to commit itself to bright-line 
rules because doing so could discourage solutions to new problems, 
especially where new problems have no analog in recent history.235 In 
the area of criminal procedure, however, the concern of societal 
change largely falls away because the reasons for granting criminal 
rights remain the same.236 
Consider the constancy surrounding the right to counsel: as long 
as justice is administered through the adversarial system, a defendant 
must have resources necessary to face the power of the state. Given 
that the adversarial system is deeply rooted in the American tradition 
and conception of justice, the Court can lay down a bright-line rule 
protecting the right to counsel without concern that societal change 
will alter the role of counsel in the near future.237 Although society’s 
interest in combating crime influences the scope of the right to 
counsel of choice,238 once a violation of that right is discovered (by a 
court finding of wrongful denial of counsel of choice), the only 
remaining countervailing interest is that of judicial efficiency in 
avoiding a new trial. The Court appropriately imposed a bright-line 
 
 234. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562–65 (identifying a need to distinguish 
between the right to counsel of choice and the right to effective assistance of counsel and the 
need to avoid the uncertainty of harmless error review). 
 235. See Chen, supra note 12, at 266; Fisher, supra note 5, at 1535; Sullivan, supra note 
196, at 66. 
 236. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1535. 
 237. With the Court’s knowledge of trial procedure and the constancy of that procedure, 
there should be less concern over the use of bright-line rules to protect criminal rights. Even 
those who criticize bright-line rules could recognize an exception that allows for their use 
under such conditions. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 212–13 (“[W]hen the Court has reason 
for confidence in a wide ruling, narrowness is a mistake.”). 
 238. The scope of the right to counsel of choice is limited in significant aspects, as 
discussed supra note 82 and accompanying text. In addition, the public can influence the scope 
of that right, as seen in the use of forfeiture statutes. These statutes effectively deprive a 
defendant of the opportunity to be represented by counsel of choice by preventing the 
defendant from paying for an attorney out of the proceeds of the alleged crime. See Karlan, 
supra note 140, at 705. The forfeiture statutes survived constitutional challenge in Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) and United States v. Monsanto, 491 
U.S. 600 (1989). 
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rule because the nature of the efficiency interest and the right to 
counsel of choice remain largely the same over time.239 
These three considerations justify the Court’s application of a 
bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, apart from a preference for 
limited judicial discretion or bright-line rules. The Court’s familiarity 
with trial practice, a greater need for formalism, and the unchanging 
nature of criminal defense all weigh in favor of applying a bright-line 
rule protecting a defendant’s right to counsel of choice. Of these 
three considerations, the Court’s knowledge of the importance of 
counsel to an accused’s defense seems to have carried the greatest 
weight in this case, given that the Court devoted much of its 
discussion to that point.240 The Court’s rule ensures that future 
courts will resolve any uncertainty in the effect of wrongful denial of 
counsel in favor of the defendant. 
Absent such factors, an inference may arise that a preference for 
limited judicial discretion241 led to the bright-line rule in Gonzalez-
Lopez, meaning that only stare decisis principles would hinder a 
future Court in applying its own preference for a balancing test. 
Although Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does not fully 
explain the bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, it provides a helpful 
framework and will prove useful in future cases. Even where 
constitutional choice analysis does not resolve the issue of whether to 
apply a bright-line rule, other considerations show why the Court 
should favor bright-line rules in the criminal procedure context. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent developments in constitutional criminal law, beginning 
with Crawford and Blakely, and continuing with the recent decision 
in Gonzalez-Lopez, may indicate that the current Court is more 
inclined than previous Courts to adopt bright-line rules to protect 
the constitutional rights of defendants. If this indicates a trend for 
future jurisprudence, the question arises as to what drives the 
trend—a methodological preference for limited judicial discretion or 
 
 239. Although a given court’s degree of interest in efficiency may increase due to 
crowded dockets, the nature of the interest remains the same. Similarly, the defendant’s 
interest in counsel of choice may be greater when faced with a more onerous sentence, but the 
nature of the interest remains the same regardless of the sentence faced. 
 240. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564–65 (2006). 
 241. See supra note 36. 
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context-specific factors. Jeffrey L. Fisher argued Crawford, Blakely, 
and most recently Gonzalez-Lopez, in which the Court held that a 
defendant who is erroneously denied counsel of choice must receive 
a new trial—without the judicial balancing of harmless error review. 
Although the history of the right to counsel may not have mandated 
this bright-line rule, Fisher’s analysis helps show why the Court held 
as it did. His “constitutional choice” analysis provides a neutral 
criterion for determining the applicability of bright-line rules. That 
analysis involves deciding whether the Constitution has chosen to 
administer rights through a bright-line procedure. Although 
constitutional choice analysis did not clearly dictate a bright-line rule 
protecting counsel of choice in Gonzalez-Lopez, the criminal 
procedure context justifies the use of such a rule. In the criminal 
context, the Court has the experience necessary to formulate valid 
rules, and the important rights at stake implicate a greater need for 
formalism. Additionally, the static nature of the criminal trial means 
that a rule laid down today will not need modification tomorrow. 
These considerations support the use of a bright-line rule in 
Gonzalez-Lopez, and proffer an explanation independent of a putative 
preference for limited judicial discretion. This case may confirm the 
beginning of a trend toward bright-line rules in criminal law, a trend 
that could also influence other areas of constitutional interpretation. 
Jacob D. Briggs 
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